America Must Prioritize Somali-Owned Peace and Nation Building Process

June 13, 2025 

The foreign policy approach of the Trump-Vance Administration appears to be a commitment to the principle of “peace through strength,” as articulated by the America First Policy Institute. Historically, peace through strength conjures up the apparition of total disregard for the inviolability of the borders of sovereign nations. It likewise can be interpreted as the total sum of a neoliberal industrial and economic domination.

Trump’s approach to advancing U.S. strategic interests focuses on promoting “America First” principles. This means putting domestic priorities first (i.e., reviving American manufacturing through protectionist trade policies and maintaining high defense spending). However, as former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice recently remarked, “Empires don’t mind their own business,” suggesting that the U.S. should not retreat from its global leadership role. Leading by example and promoting peace and security remains vital. 

In this context, avoiding actions that might fuel instability in the Horn of Africa, especially in Somalia, would be a wise course of action. However, calls to recognize “Somaliland”’s unilateral, clan-based secession has been gaining traction behind closed doors. This is a misleading and myopic policy to embrace. The Heritage Foundation has taken a lead role in these impetuous calls. It has a track record of recommending regressive and harmful policies. A cautionary example lies in the widespread criticism and disavowal of Project 2025, which President Trump himself had repeatedly distanced himself from, prior to his election through various media appearances. Project 2025 calls for the recognition of “Somaliland”. 

Recognition for the unilateral, single clan-based secession in northern Somalia is a recipe for disaster as it leads to intractable ethnic and regional conflicts that would cause further mayhem and destruction to the Horn of Africa region, particularly Somalia. "Somaliland"s political elite has no qualms about weaponizing foreign aid or using extreme methods to reach and control a long-defunct, colonial-era borders. More recently, the eastern portion of northern Somalia has experienced significant armed conflicts, human rights abuses, and hundreds of thousands of families being targeted and forced to flee their homes in Las Anod, Sool and Erigabo, Sanaag. 

The Trump-Vance administration should be wary of the fragility of Somalia. A comprehensive peace and reconciliation process can bring a viable resolution and healing to Somalia’s internal, clan-based conflict.  Diplomatic efforts should focus on mediating internal grievances and resolving the land and resource disputes that fuel the violence. This must be the right U.S. foreign policy approach to support democratic institutions, strengthen the central government, and respect Somalia's territorial integrity. A strategic position that aligns well with the broader goals of fostering stability and reducing the threat of extremism! 

Practically, “peace through strength” should accomplish these goals without further entanglement and without harming a fragile yet strategically important region. It would help advance U.S. geopolitical interests.

By prioritizing Somali-owned peace-building and national reconciliation, President Trump restores a much-needed U.S. global leadership that guides current AU and UN efforts to bolstering sustainable peace in Africa and beyond. Disregarding the above common sense approach risks deepening the crisis and  might lead to greater fragmentation and long-term instability in Somalia. 

Mohamed Elmi 

Minneapolis, MN

Somaliland’s Aggression Against Maakhir Coast

On April 24, 2025, well-armed clan militias, operating under the banner of the secessionist Somaliland administration, stormed the coastal waters of Laasqoray, Sanaag region, aboard high-speed boats. 

The aggression against Laasqoray town by Somaliland's forces showcases a troubling escalation. This is not merely a dispute over territory; it is an orchestrated series of hostile actions aimed at destabilizing Maakhir.

In December 2024, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that nearly 43,000 people were displaced in Erigavo town, Sanaag region due to an orchestrated armed violence by “Somaliland” forces and Isaq militias.[1] Over 60% of the displaced families were targeted due to their clan (as members of the Warsangeli Harti) and opposition to "Somaliland's" unilateral secession (OCHA, 2024). The 2024 incident was instigated by General Nuh Tani of Somaliland, a perpetrator of war crimes in Las Anod. Gen. Nuh Tani visited Erigavo on October 15, 2023, and threatened the Harti community. 

The Maakhir coast, known for its lush northern slope of the Cal Madow Mountain, long coastline, and history of self-governance, now faces ever growing militarization and violent incursions that threaten the very fabric of its society. 

On April 24, 2025, in a brutal and coordinated assault, Somaliland’s clan militia hijacked several locally owned fishing vessels off the coast of Laas Qoray and abducted nearly 60 Somali fishermen, civilians whose only offense was earning an honest living at sea. The attackers deliberately veered off their expected maritime route, concealed their identities, and carried out their mission from the East with military precision, a premeditated act of aggression aimed at destabilizing the Haylaan and Sanaag regions of Somalia's Maakhir State.

This brazen act is not an anomaly; it is the latest chapter in a disturbing pattern of hostility. It echoes an earlier provocation documented in 2011 by ECOP-Marine, when a British Royal Navy warship, reportedly carrying the commander of the so-called “Somaliland navy”, approached the very same shores of Laasqoray. The report documents how the British Royal Navy attracted a “serious military fire” upon coming close to the shore off Laasqoray. From that foreign vessel, amphibious and commando boats were launched. The incident was widely condemned as a flagrant violation of Somalia’s sovereignty, and “specifically of the Warsangeli territory”[2].

Once again, history seems to repeat itself, only this time with greater impunity and more direct violence. It is a campaign that weaponizes international aid to fund chaos, turning development dollars into bullets. Let us be clear: The abduction of non-combatant fishermen constitutes a gross violation of international humanitarian law. It is also a direct assault on Somalia’s territorial integrity and the vision of a unified federal state.

The Maakhir region, strategically vital and resilient through generations, must not be left to bear this assault alone. The Federal Government of Somalia (SFG) must act decisively to support the interim administration of Maakhir State. Silence in the face of such organized violence is not neutrality; it is complicity. Donors must demand accountability and not allow their aid to be diverted into secessionist violence.

The people of Maakhir have long been committed to peace and security in northern Somalia. But no community, no matter how strong, can withstand relentless waves of aggression if the world chooses to look away. As in 2011 and the recent orchestrated Erigavo violence that uprooted hundreds of non-Isaq families, so today: this must be condemned, categorically and without delay.

By weaponizing international aid, the Somaliland administration has transformed the good intent of donors into instruments of oppression and turning lifelines into landmines. That aid package should have built schools, roads, and clinics is instead funding abductions and sowing discord. It is an egregious betrayal of humanitarian principles and a crime against the spirit of federalism and unity that Somalia strives to uphold.

This latest act of aggression is part of a broader, dangerous campaign to redraw defunct colonial borders through sporadic assaults and by force. To fail to hold “Somaliland” accountable is to abandon the very ideals of peace and self-determination that international law exists to protect.

Laasqoray residents celebrating "World Oceans Day" 2023

Mohamed Elmi 

ahafinance@gmail.com

Minneapolis, MN

References: 

1. ECOP-marine. (2011, July 11). British Royal Navy warship entangled in domestic affairs skirmish. 

2. OCHA. (2024, December 18). SOMALIA: Armed Violence in Ceerigaabo town, Sanaag region. Retrieved from https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/somalia/somalia-armed-violence-ceerigaabo-town-sanaag-region-flash-update-no1-18-december-2024

3. SEDO. (2023, June 8). Laasqoray communities celebrate World Oceans Day 2023. Retrieved from https://sedosomalia.org/?p=4673

[1] OCHA. (2024, December 18). SOMALIA: Armed Violence in Ceerigaabo town, Sanaag region. 

[2] ECOP-marine. (2011, July 11). British Royal Navy warship entangled in domestic affairs skirmish. 

The “Somaliland” Secessionist Argument: South Sudan and Eritrea’s Case

Context

The historical contexts surrounding the independence movements of South Sudan and Eritrea differ significantly from that of “Somaliland”. Eritrea was an Italian colony from the late 19th century until World War II, when it briefly came under British administration before being federated with Ethiopia in 1952. It was annexed as a province in 1962. The Eritrean struggle for independence was largely a reaction to Ethiopian annexation and the subsequent denial of basic rights, autonomy, and self-determination. Likewise, South Sudan's path to independence was deeply rooted in the colonial legacy of British administration, which treated the predominantly Christian and non-Christian South Sudan separately from the Muslim-majority North Sudan. After Sudan got its independence from Great Britain, the southerners rejected to celebrate with Khartoum citing denial of basic rights, uneven economic distribution, and potential domination by the powerful groups in the North. 

The independence movements in both South Sudan and Eritrea were thus motivated by clear historical ethnic grievances and colonial legacies that sharply distinguished their situations from that of “Somaliland”. On the other hand, the northern regions, “Somaliland”, voluntarily joined with the Trust Territory of Somalia in 1960 to form the Somali Republic. The union was not forced or imposed but was a decision made by the respective legislative bodies of the two territories. This historical decision creates a significant difference in the foundational context of modern Somaliland’s quest for independence compared to the forcibly annexed regions of Eritrea and South Sudan.

May 18, 1991

Somaliland's proclamation of independence on May 18, 1991, stemmed from a unilateral decision by the Isaq clan. Other prominent Somali clans such as the Warsangeli, Dolbahante, and Gudabirsi vehemently opposed this unilateral secession but agreed to uphold inter-clan peace accords. For instance, the Hadaftimo peace agreement of 1993, presided over by Sultan Abdisalan, underscores the resolute stance of the Warsangeli clan in maintaining the unity of the Somali Republic.

The African Union (AU), Arab League, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and United Nations (UN) formally recognize Puntland and "Somaliland" as integral units within Somalia's federal framework, despite their distinct political identities. These administrations have garnered UN-sanctioned legitimacy for their local governance, thereby facilitating an environment conducive to rehabilitation and development to rebuild Somalia (cf. UN Resolution ARES/53/1, December 8, 1998). Nevertheless, their rivalry has precipitated proxy conflicts over the Sool (Khatumo) and Sanaag (Makhir) regions, exacerbating security and economic conditions in Sool, particularly in its capital, Las Anod.

Legal and Moral Arguments

From a legal standpoint, Eritrea and South Sudan were recognized as distinct entities within the international community, albeit under colonial rule, and their struggles were often framed as liberation movements against colonial or quasi-colonial rule. The Eritrean case was fortified by a UN resolution that federated it with Ethiopia under the Ethiopian Crown. The UN resolution provided a legal basis for Eritrea’s claim to self-determination after Ethiopia violated the terms of federation. South Sudan’s legal basis for independence was cemented by comprehensive peace agreements, including the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Kenya, which provided for the formation of a transitional government and a referendum that eventually led to independence.

In contrast, Somaliland's assertion that the union was involuntary is unsubstantiated and misleading. In 1959, extensive protests across the Somali protectorate compelled the Protectorate Legislative Council in Hargeisa to create a resolution for independence and immediate union with Somalia by April 6, 1960—almost two months before June 26, the day commemorating the replacement of the British Union Jack with Somalia's national flag. Britain promptly endorsed this resolution, albeit concerns about the brief transition period. Political demonstrations, particularly concerning the undisclosed transfer of the Hawd and Reserve Area to Ethiopia, further induced Britain to endorse the permanent amalgamation of British Somaliland with Italian Somaliland to establish the Somali Republic.

Essentially, Somaliland’s secession lacks similar international legal backing. The African Union (AU) has consistently upheld the principle of respecting the current borders, which inherently includes the territorial integrity of Somalia as it was recognized at independence and the merger of the two regions on July 1, 1960. The AU’s opposition to changing colonial borders is a pragmatic and long-standing policy to ensure the stability and territorial integrity of African states. The principle of uti possidetis juris and the support for sovereignty as outlined in the AU Charter are foundational to the continent's peace and security framework. This policy approach underscores the importance of negotiated settlementsand the respect for existing legal frameworks to address aspirations for autonomy and self-determination within the bounds of established states.

International Norms and Sovereignty

International norms, particularly those pertaining to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, significantly impact the recognition of secessionist entities. The international community has generally been cautious in endorsing secessionist movements to avoid setting precedents that could lead to widespread instability. Both Eritrea and South Sudan's paths to independence were heavily mediated by international actors and framed within comprehensive peace processes that ensured a degree of stability and consensus.

For “Somaliland”, the issue is more complex. The international community, including the AU and the United Nations, is wary of recognizing Somaliland's independence without a negotiated settlement with the Somali federal government. The concern is that recognizing “Somaliland” could encourage other secessionist movements in Africa and beyond, thereby undermining the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity enshrined in international law.

Conclusion 

While there are lessons to be drawn from the Eritrean and South Sudanese struggles for independence, the unique historical, legal, and geopolitical contexts of “Somaliland” require comprehensive moral and legal approach that starts first with the rights of unionist clans in northern Somalia. Respecting Somalia's sovereignty and seeking a negotiated settlement is another viable approach. "Somaliland" is currently recognized as a regional administration within the  framework of the Federal Republic of Somalia. Khatumo and Makhir regions should likewise be accorded a similar treatment. 

By Mohamed Elmi Dhooley 

ahafinance@gmail.com

References:

1.     Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (2005). Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Mission in Sudan.

2.     Cotran, E. (1963). Legal Problems Arising out of the Formation of the Somali Republic. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 12(3).

3.     Elmi, M. (2024, June). The Two Camps of Maakhir Political Persuasion. Google Blogger.

The Two Camps of Maakhir Political Persuasion

  

Mohamed Elmi Dhooley

June 20, 2024

“You can always count on Americans to do the right thing - after they've tried everything else” - Winston Churchill

The essence of the above quote attributed to Winston Churchill is when people are persistent or  exhaust all other options in quest of justice, they finally arrive at the right solution even if it takes years and years of trial and error.

In 2009, General Abdullah Jama Ilkajir made a momentous decision to run for Puntland's presidential election. His campaign was fueled by a steadfast determination to unite his fragmented society, eradicate corruption, оr put an end to the exploitation of Somalia's maritime and land resources. His mission extended further to addressing and reversing the deeply rooted injustices within Puntland's clan-based, power-sharing system. Recognized as a beacon of hope and integrity, General Ilkajir garnered substantial support both in Somalia and in the diaspora. Originating from Maakhir, then a self-proclaimed state in northern Somalia, his influence was so profound that, according to reliable sources, he had compelled its president into exile. 

His leadership was seen as a turning point, offering a new vision for a region long plagued by political and economic decline and otherwise nonexistent or fragile institutions. Despite his charisma and leadership qualities, General Ilka-jir chose to avoid the legitimate demands of his people, a new political direction. His decision to accept a mere ministerial post confirmed to many the vacuum of principled political leadership in the Maakhir region. 

The prevailing sentiment among politicians, clan elders, civil servants, business leaders, diaspora technocrats, and students from Maakhir can be divided into two camps. The first camp, the old guard, views collaboration with Puntland as essential and non-negotiable, believing in a symbiotic relationship between Sanaag, western Bari, Hayland (SWBH) and Puntland. However, this alliance defended by the old guard comes with a significant cost and detrimental effect on the region as a whole. Politically directed projects often fail to address local needs, resulting in a lack of consensus on priorities. This misalignment also leads to ongoing disorganization and inefficiency in governance. Additionally, the old guard's approach stifles accountability (isla-xisaabtan) and hinders the region's potential for autonomous development, perpetuating dependence on Puntland’s power brokers while limiting Maakhir's ability to pursue its own strategic interests.

The second camp, the Young Turks of Maakhir, recognizes the urgent need for political reform and self-governance, emphasizing that Maakhir's current state of political and economic stagnation cannot be sustained. They argue that a shift towards an autonomous governance structure is imperative for the region's development and stability. This camp is acutely aware that the decentralized aid programs from international organizations like the United Nations are frequently misappropriated. Without formal recognition from any country or legal body, Maakhir lacks the authority to enter into binding agreements in the interests of commerce, FDIs, or to regulate the flow and management of aid effectively. 

The absence of formal recognition presents significant challenges. It undermines the region's capacity to engage in regional and international diplomacy, secure investment, and implement sustainable development projects. The inability to protect Maakhir's land and natural resources from foreign exploitation is a direct consequence of this lack of recognition. This issue is starkly illustrated by the conflicts instigated by Africa Oil and Range Resources in Majihan, Bari in the past. Previously, these foreign companies have exploited the region's natural resources without the consent of Maakhiris or compensation to the local population, leading to environmental degradation, displacement, and social unrest.

The exploitation of Maakhir's resources by foreign corporations highlights the vulnerability of the region under its current governance structure within Puntland. The local communities have little to no say in the management and benefits of their own natural resources and tax revenues, resulting in a loss of potential revenue that could be used for local development. The second camp contends that establishing a recognized and autonomous governance system would enable Maakhir to negotiate fairer terms with foreign investors, ensuring that the exploitation of natural resources benefits the local population and contributes to sustainable development.

Moreover, the establishment of self-governance is seen as a pathway to fostering greater political stability and social cohesion within Maakhir. By creating institutions that are accountable to the local population, this camp believes that trust in leadership can be restored, and the people of Maakhir can work collectively towards common goals. This would involve building a robust legal framework to protect property rights, enforce contracts, and manage disputes—critical components for attracting investment and fostering economic growth.

Lastly, the Young Turks of Maakhir, advocate for a comprehensive approach to structural change that encompasses not only political autonomy but also economic and social reforms. They envision a future where Maakhir is recognized as a legitimate political entity within the Federal Republic of Somalia, capable of managing its own affairs and utilizing its resources to improve the lives of its people. This vision includes developing infrastructure such as the rehabilitation of the Las Qoray Port and its connecting Geeldoora route, the Eldahir-Ergiavo Road Project, education, healthcare, and other essential services that are currently underdeveloped due to the region's political marginalization. By addressing these issues, Maakhir can transform from a region struggling with exploitation and neglect to one that is self-sufficient, prosperous, and a respected member of the Federal Republic of Somalia.

As Max Weber argued, "Political power does not stem just from economic resources” such as direct control of functioning national ports or oil fields but from the expressive qualities of honest leaders representing organized community with long-term vision. Power can reside in organization (which entails durable resources).

The argument that Maakhir lacks the resources for self-support is weak. The current socio-economic conditions of SWBH are reversible if Maakhiris acknowledge one of the root causes –those who prioritize personal gain over the long-term interests of their people—and work toward self-governance. Per the essence of Churchill’s quote, it is my belief that this solution is the only viable one left for us to eliminate the “disputed status”, bridge the gap in underdevelopment, and improve livelihood standards. Ultimately, Maakhir will be recognized as a legitimate and integral part of Somalia's political landscape.

Mohamed Elmi

Email: ahafinance@gmail.com

Minneapolis, MN

NORTH AMERICA CONFERENCE: MAKHIR COMMUNITY

 

The formation of Maakhir - The Economist

 

Breaking into even smaller bits?

Even the parts of Somalia that were steady are looking shaky again

04 Oct, 2007

A PECULIARITY of Somalia is that while the south of the country, including its broken capital, Mogadishu, has burned, the north has been stable. Now, to the horror of those trying to put Mogadishu back together again, the north is beginning to crack too. Fighting broke out this week between Somaliland, the northern strip that has been virtually independent of the rest of the country for some 16 years, and Puntland, a semi-autonomous territory in the north-east (see map). Somaliland says it has driven Puntland forces out of Los Anod, a town in the disputed Sool region, killing six Puntlanders and injuring or capturing another 40-plus. Puntland says its soldiers have retaken the town. Yet another war seems to be breaking out.

Sool is split between sub-clans backing either Somaliland or Puntland, while some of them want autonomy for Sool itself. Somaliland, a former British colony that was separate from the larger parts that were run by Italy, declared independence in 1991 and has since sought international recognition. Puntland's sense of identity is less strong; it has seen itself as a building block for a future federal Somalia.

But Puntland is losing its grip. The Sool dispute has been compounded by the secession of much of the Sanaag region from Puntland, to form yet another self-governing entity in the north. Drawing on its history as a sultanate, Sanaag declared independence in July, renamed itself Makhir, and chose Badhan as its capital. Tension between Makhir and Puntland is high.

A still worse headache for Puntland is the departure of its strongman, Abdullahi Yusuf, to become president of Somalia. He ran Puntland with authority and ambition, grandiosely hoping to turn it into the Horn of Africa's Dubai. When he went south, he took with him a lot of Puntland troops, vehicles, weapons and ammunition. Their departure emboldened other northerners with dreams of secession or autonomy, and may give Somaliland the edge if the dispute over Sool leads to war.

Oil and gas add fuel to the ferment. Exploration rights in Puntland have been sold several times over. Somalia's prickly prime minister, Ali Mohamed Gedi, was furious when Mr Yusuf signed oil agreements without telling him, including one with a Chinese company. Mr Gedi has also refused to endorse exploration deals signed by Puntland's government.

Meanwhile, Mogadishu is getting worse again. Fewer children are going to school. The city's markets are stagnant—quite the opposite of the government's assertions that things are back to normal. Government troops and the Ethiopian forces propping up Somalia's government are still being attacked by bombs, grenades and snipers of the Islamist militias ousted by Ethiopians early this year.

The African Union promised to send 8,000 peacekeepers and then hand authority to a UN mission later this year. But several AU countries failed to honour their pledges. Uganda is still the only African one to have sent troops; with just 1,600 of them there, the UN is unlikely to come in and take over.

The American administration and other Western governments still want to back Somalia's transitional government until elections due in 2009. A recent reconciliation conference in Mogadishu passed off without rancour, itself something of a success, and was bolstered by the apparent failure of a rival meeting, mainly of Somali Islamists, in the Eritrean capital, Asmara.

Source: Economist.com

Somalia: An Open Letter to Coastline Exploration

Coastline Exploration 

Houston, Texas

United States

January 9, 2023

Dear William and Jacob: 

I've read and followed with interest Coastline Exploration's Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) with the Federal  Government of Somalia (SFG) on October 21, 2022. The agreement grants your company an exclusive contract to explore seven (7) offshore blocks that are within the areas under the direct control of SFG. Information about the PSA, the company’s current market valuation (if any), its physical assets (i.e., mobile or fixed platforms or rigs) and details about the designated offshore fields within Somalia’s territorial sea and Exclusive Economic Zone is scarce. 

Several hydrocarbon study projects show that Somalia is one of the last unexplored oil and gas frontiers (see Mapping Oil Exploration in Somalia and Ethiopia, 2016). While oil exploration and development play a vital role in the global economy, ideological and clan-based conflicts in Somalia have hampered oil discovery. President Hassan believes the signing of the PSA should deliver "material benefits for all Somalis".  

However, the president ignores the real cost of his good intentions that would probably improve the living standards and wellbeing of Somalis if and when oil is discovered and developed. The processes, systems, and infrastructure needed to undertake these types of projects are extremely complex and capital-intensive, meaning production and refining of oil products barely create jobs for the local economy. For countries that lack checks and balances or strong institutions, the small share of profits generated is prone to misappropriation and embezzlement. The process is even more volatile in an unstable political environment and can trigger armed struggle over territoriality and the ownership of the resources. Africa Oil and Ranger Resources are some of the small companies that had previously failed in these endeavors. See the Warsangeli-Puntland conflict (2006 - 2013), by Markus Virgil Hoehne published at JSTOR. 

Per the company's website, Coastline Exploration was founded in 2018 in Houston, Texas with a particular interest in exploring Somalia’s untapped offshore oil and gas potential. The company's founders drew their inspiration from the recent discovery of oil and gas in East Africa and the confirmed working petroleum system that North Somalia shares with Yemen (see the map). The founders are overall sanguine about the oil-sourcing potential in Somalia. However, Somalia still lacks a unified national government; the rule of law in the areas under the control of the SFG, which the company intends to explore, is to a large extent nonexistent since the SFG declared war on the insurgent group, al-Shabab. After decades of international backing and support, The SFG is still struggling to build consensus that should lay down a working system of governance and of justice. The country as a whole is fragmented along clan lines in the form of semi-autonomous regions that often defy or question the legitimacy of the SFG.  

My concern was elevated when I read an article by Reuters, which reported that no government officials were reachable for comment after your company  paid a $7million signature bonus to the Somali authorities for signing the PSA. 

Granted the company is obliged to comply with the PSA it has signed and the laws under which it is incorporated (including environmental standards), I hope you will consider the issues highlighted in this letter and share any information or insight that  might keep the process of exploration transparent and equitable for the hapless Somali people. 

Thank you! 

Mohamed Elmi