The “Somaliland” Secessionist Argument: South Sudan and Eritrea’s Case

Context

The historical contexts surrounding the independence movements of South Sudan and Eritrea differ significantly from that of “Somaliland”. Eritrea was an Italian colony from the late 19th century until World War II, when it briefly came under British administration before being federated with Ethiopia in 1952. It was annexed as a province in 1962. The Eritrean struggle for independence was largely a reaction to Ethiopian annexation and the subsequent denial of basic rights, autonomy, and self-determination. Likewise, South Sudan's path to independence was deeply rooted in the colonial legacy of British administration, which treated the predominantly Christian and non-Christian South Sudan separately from the Muslim-majority North Sudan. After Sudan got its independence from Great Britain, the southerners rejected to celebrate with Khartoum citing denial of basic rights, uneven economic distribution, and potential domination by the powerful groups in the North. 

The independence movements in both South Sudan and Eritrea were thus motivated by clear historical ethnic grievances and colonial legacies that sharply distinguished their situations from that of “Somaliland”. On the other hand, the northern regions, “Somaliland”, voluntarily joined with the Trust Territory of Somalia in 1960 to form the Somali Republic. The union was not forced or imposed but was a decision made by the respective legislative bodies of the two territories. This historical decision creates a significant difference in the foundational context of modern Somaliland’s quest for independence compared to the forcibly annexed regions of Eritrea and South Sudan.

May 18, 1991

Somaliland's proclamation of independence on May 18, 1991, stemmed from a unilateral decision by the Isaq clan. Other prominent Somali clans such as the Warsangeli, Dolbahante, and Gudabirsi vehemently opposed this unilateral secession but agreed to uphold inter-clan peace accords. For instance, the Hadaftimo peace agreement of 1993, presided over by Sultan Abdisalan, underscores the resolute stance of the Warsangeli clan in maintaining the unity of the Somali Republic.

The African Union (AU), Arab League, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and United Nations (UN) formally recognize Puntland and "Somaliland" as integral units within Somalia's federal framework, despite their distinct political identities. These administrations have garnered UN-sanctioned legitimacy for their local governance, thereby facilitating an environment conducive to rehabilitation and development to rebuild Somalia (cf. UN Resolution ARES/53/1, December 8, 1998). Nevertheless, their rivalry has precipitated proxy conflicts over the Sool (Khatumo) and Sanaag (Makhir) regions, exacerbating security and economic conditions in Sool, particularly in its capital, Las Anod.

Legal and Moral Arguments

From a legal standpoint, Eritrea and South Sudan were recognized as distinct entities within the international community, albeit under colonial rule, and their struggles were often framed as liberation movements against colonial or quasi-colonial rule. The Eritrean case was fortified by a UN resolution that federated it with Ethiopia under the Ethiopian Crown. The UN resolution provided a legal basis for Eritrea’s claim to self-determination after Ethiopia violated the terms of federation. South Sudan’s legal basis for independence was cemented by comprehensive peace agreements, including the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Kenya, which provided for the formation of a transitional government and a referendum that eventually led to independence.

In contrast, Somaliland's assertion that the union was involuntary is unsubstantiated and misleading. In 1959, extensive protests across the Somali protectorate compelled the Protectorate Legislative Council in Hargeisa to create a resolution for independence and immediate union with Somalia by April 6, 1960—almost two months before June 26, the day commemorating the replacement of the British Union Jack with Somalia's national flag. Britain promptly endorsed this resolution, albeit concerns about the brief transition period. Political demonstrations, particularly concerning the undisclosed transfer of the Hawd and Reserve Area to Ethiopia, further induced Britain to endorse the permanent amalgamation of British Somaliland with Italian Somaliland to establish the Somali Republic.

Essentially, Somaliland’s secession lacks similar international legal backing. The African Union (AU) has consistently upheld the principle of respecting the current borders, which inherently includes the territorial integrity of Somalia as it was recognized at independence and the merger of the two regions on July 1, 1960. The AU’s opposition to changing colonial borders is a pragmatic and long-standing policy to ensure the stability and territorial integrity of African states. The principle of uti possidetis juris and the support for sovereignty as outlined in the AU Charter are foundational to the continent's peace and security framework. This policy approach underscores the importance of negotiated settlementsand the respect for existing legal frameworks to address aspirations for autonomy and self-determination within the bounds of established states.

International Norms and Sovereignty

International norms, particularly those pertaining to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, significantly impact the recognition of secessionist entities. The international community has generally been cautious in endorsing secessionist movements to avoid setting precedents that could lead to widespread instability. Both Eritrea and South Sudan's paths to independence were heavily mediated by international actors and framed within comprehensive peace processes that ensured a degree of stability and consensus.

For “Somaliland”, the issue is more complex. The international community, including the AU and the United Nations, is wary of recognizing Somaliland's independence without a negotiated settlement with the Somali federal government. The concern is that recognizing “Somaliland” could encourage other secessionist movements in Africa and beyond, thereby undermining the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity enshrined in international law.

Conclusion 

While there are lessons to be drawn from the Eritrean and South Sudanese struggles for independence, the unique historical, legal, and geopolitical contexts of “Somaliland” require comprehensive moral and legal approach that starts first with the rights of unionist clans in northern Somalia. Respecting Somalia's sovereignty and seeking a negotiated settlement is another viable approach. "Somaliland" is currently recognized as a regional administration within the  framework of the Federal Republic of Somalia. Khatumo and Makhir regions should likewise be accorded a similar treatment. 

By Mohamed Elmi Dhooley 

ahafinance@gmail.com

References:

1.     Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (2005). Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Mission in Sudan.

2.     Cotran, E. (1963). Legal Problems Arising out of the Formation of the Somali Republic. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 12(3).

3.     Elmi, M. (2024, June). The Two Camps of Maakhir Political Persuasion. Google Blogger.

The Two Camps of Maakhir Political Persuasion

  

Mohamed Elmi Dhooley

June 20, 2024

“You can always count on Americans to do the right thing - after they've tried everything else” - Winston Churchill

The essence of the above quote attributed to Winston Churchill is when people are persistent or  exhaust all other options in quest of justice, they finally arrive at the right solution even if it takes years and years of trial and error.

In 2009, General Abdullah Jama Ilkajir made a momentous decision to run for Puntland's presidential election. His campaign was fueled by a steadfast determination to unite his fragmented society, eradicate corruption, оr put an end to the exploitation of Somalia's maritime and land resources. His mission extended further to addressing and reversing the deeply rooted injustices within Puntland's clan-based, power-sharing system. Recognized as a beacon of hope and integrity, General Ilkajir garnered substantial support both in Somalia and in the diaspora. Originating from Maakhir, then a self-proclaimed state in northern Somalia, his influence was so profound that, according to reliable sources, he had compelled its president into exile. 

His leadership was seen as a turning point, offering a new vision for a region long plagued by political and economic decline and otherwise nonexistent or fragile institutions. Despite his charisma and leadership qualities, General Ilka-jir chose to avoid the legitimate demands of his people, a new political direction. His decision to accept a mere ministerial post confirmed to many the vacuum of principled political leadership in the Maakhir region. 

The prevailing sentiment among politicians, clan elders, civil servants, business leaders, diaspora technocrats, and students from Maakhir can be divided into two camps. The first camp, the old guard, views collaboration with Puntland as essential and non-negotiable, believing in a symbiotic relationship between Sanaag, western Bari, Hayland (SWBH) and Puntland. However, this alliance defended by the old guard comes with a significant cost and detrimental effect on the region as a whole. Politically directed projects often fail to address local needs, resulting in a lack of consensus on priorities. This misalignment also leads to ongoing disorganization and inefficiency in governance. Additionally, the old guard's approach stifles accountability (isla-xisaabtan) and hinders the region's potential for autonomous development, perpetuating dependence on Puntland’s power brokers while limiting Maakhir's ability to pursue its own strategic interests.

The second camp, the Young Turks of Maakhir, recognizes the urgent need for political reform and self-governance, emphasizing that Maakhir's current state of political and economic stagnation cannot be sustained. They argue that a shift towards an autonomous governance structure is imperative for the region's development and stability. This camp is acutely aware that the decentralized aid programs from international organizations like the United Nations are frequently misappropriated. Without formal recognition from any country or legal body, Maakhir lacks the authority to enter into binding agreements in the interests of commerce, FDIs, or to regulate the flow and management of aid effectively. 

The absence of formal recognition presents significant challenges. It undermines the region's capacity to engage in regional and international diplomacy, secure investment, and implement sustainable development projects. The inability to protect Maakhir's land and natural resources from foreign exploitation is a direct consequence of this lack of recognition. This issue is starkly illustrated by the conflicts instigated by Africa Oil and Range Resources in Majihan, Bari in the past. Previously, these foreign companies have exploited the region's natural resources without the consent of Maakhiris or compensation to the local population, leading to environmental degradation, displacement, and social unrest.

The exploitation of Maakhir's resources by foreign corporations highlights the vulnerability of the region under its current governance structure within Puntland. The local communities have little to no say in the management and benefits of their own natural resources and tax revenues, resulting in a loss of potential revenue that could be used for local development. The second camp contends that establishing a recognized and autonomous governance system would enable Maakhir to negotiate fairer terms with foreign investors, ensuring that the exploitation of natural resources benefits the local population and contributes to sustainable development.

Moreover, the establishment of self-governance is seen as a pathway to fostering greater political stability and social cohesion within Maakhir. By creating institutions that are accountable to the local population, this camp believes that trust in leadership can be restored, and the people of Maakhir can work collectively towards common goals. This would involve building a robust legal framework to protect property rights, enforce contracts, and manage disputes—critical components for attracting investment and fostering economic growth.

Lastly, the Young Turks of Maakhir, advocate for a comprehensive approach to structural change that encompasses not only political autonomy but also economic and social reforms. They envision a future where Maakhir is recognized as a legitimate political entity within the Federal Republic of Somalia, capable of managing its own affairs and utilizing its resources to improve the lives of its people. This vision includes developing infrastructure such as the rehabilitation of the Las Qoray Port and its connecting Geeldoora route, the Eldahir-Ergiavo Road Project, education, healthcare, and other essential services that are currently underdeveloped due to the region's political marginalization. By addressing these issues, Maakhir can transform from a region struggling with exploitation and neglect to one that is self-sufficient, prosperous, and a respected member of the Federal Republic of Somalia.

As Max Weber argued, "Political power does not stem just from economic resources” such as direct control of functioning national ports or oil fields but from the expressive qualities of honest leaders representing organized community with long-term vision. Power can reside in organization (which entails durable resources).

The argument that Maakhir lacks the resources for self-support is weak. The current socio-economic conditions of SWBH are reversible if Maakhiris acknowledge one of the root causes –those who prioritize personal gain over the long-term interests of their people—and work toward self-governance. Per the essence of Churchill’s quote, it is my belief that this solution is the only viable one left for us to eliminate the “disputed status”, bridge the gap in underdevelopment, and improve livelihood standards. Ultimately, Maakhir will be recognized as a legitimate and integral part of Somalia's political landscape.

Mohamed Elmi

Email: ahafinance@gmail.com

Minneapolis, MN